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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(e) , Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I. WERE SUFFICIENT FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF PECK'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS? 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law that should be reviewed for correctness. State v. Taylor, 884 
P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1994). See also, State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 
903 (Utah 1982) . 
ISSUE II. WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH 
CHARGES OF VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER? WAS A 
MISTAKEN COMMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE 
HARMLESS ERROR? 
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge sitting without 
a jury, an appellate court will overturn a guilty verdict only if 
it is clearly erroneous. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 
1991). Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome of the proceedings would be affected. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992). 
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ISSUE III. DOES THE DIRECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE 
TRIAL COURT NEGATE ANY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS 
OF INNOCENCE? 
This issue is similar to a allegation of insufficient evidence 
and, therefore, should be reviewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict and the verdict should be reversed only if the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable j 
minds must entertain a reasonable doubt. State v. Lyman, 352 Utah 
Adv. Rep 13(Utah App. 1998). 
ISSUE IV. DOES PECK'S BRIEF FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE i 
AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING THE VERDICTS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT? 
When attacking the findings of fact of a trial court the 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings of fact, and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inference drawn therefrom, is insufficient 
to support the findings against an attack. State v. Moosman, 794 
P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES 
§76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of 
another - Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to 
a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 
2 
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30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
Juvenile Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures 
Act, or a foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, 
who intentionally violates that order after having been properly 
served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater 
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a 
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to 
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for two 
violations of §76-5-108, Utah Code Annotated, "Protective Orders 
Restraining Abuse of Another-Violation", in the Third District 
Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Informations charging three separate violations of a 
protective order and one charge of telephone harassment were filed 
against Edward Peck ("Peck") during the spring of 1997. The cases 
were consolidated and on March 9, 1998, a bench trial on the 
consolidated charges was held before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn 
of the Third District Court. 
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At trial, Peck was convicted of two counts of Protective 
Orders Restraining Abuse of Another-Violation. The third protective 
order violation and the telephone harassment charge resulted in a 
verdict of not guilty. Peck was sentenced to serve fifteen days in 
jail which was suspended, was fined $100, and was put on probation 
to the Court for a period of twelve months. (Record P. 11) 
A Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on June 15, 1998. 
Due to a defect in the sentence and judgment documents of the trial 
court, that appeal was dismissed by Memorandum Decision of the 
Court of Appeals in Case No. 980209-CA issued June 4, 1998. The 
defect was corrected and a second Notice of Appeal was filed on 
April 2, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On December 30, 1996, Amanda Eaby ("Eaby") obtained a 
protective order against Peck. The protective order granted 
temporary custody of the parties' minor children to Eaby. Also, the 
issuing judge modified the standard no contact provisions of the 
protective order by adding the handwritten notation, "except as it 
relates to visitation." (Transcript P. 5, Lines 11-17; P. 6, Lines 
4-10; P. 14, Lines 7-25; P. 15, Lines 1-16; P. 26, Lines 19-25; P. 
27, Lines 1-8.) 
4 
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2. On February 2, 1997, Eaby was awakened by a telephone call 
at her home at approximately 1:00 AM, (Transcript, P. 6, Lines 11-
25, P. 7, Lines 21-25, P. 8, Lines 1-7.) The phone stopped ringing 
before she could answer it, so she entered a direct call-back code 
on her telephone to determine the source of the telephone call. The 
call-back feature indicated that the telephone call had come from 
Mr. Peck's residence. (Transcript, P. 7, Lines 3-8.) 
3. On February 20,1997, at approximately 11:00 PM, Eaby 
received a telephone call from Peck. (Transcript P. 9, Lines 2-5, 
15-17.) Eaby answered the telephone, "Hello," whereupon Peck stated 
her name. Peck asked if the parties could talk, to which Eaby 
responded, "No, we cannot." After a pause, Peck then stated, "We 
can't speak for a minute?" Eaby replied, "No." and after a further 
pause hung up the phone. (Transcript, P. 9, Lines 20-25; P. 10, 
Lines 1-5; P. 18, Lines 7-25; P. 19, Lines 1-3.) This conversation 
was marked by several extended pauses or moments of silence between 
the parties. (Transcript, P. 9, Lines 22-25; P. 10, Lines 1-3; P. 
18, Lines 6-9, 10-22; P. 19, Lines 2-3.) 
4 . During the conversation that took place during the February 
20, 1997, telephone call, Peck's demeanor appeared to be such that 
he was upset or something was wrong. (Transcript, P. 10, Lines 9-
14.) 
5. Approximately one half hour after the telephone call, Eaby 
discovered a funeral program for a friend of Peck's that had been 
5 
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left in her car. (Transcript, P. 10, Lines 15-25.) The deceased 
individual was one of Peck's closest friends and Peck was listed as 
a pall bearer at the funeral. (Transcript, P. 12, Lines 1-9.) Peck 
was the only individual who knew both Eaby and the deceased and was 
also privy to Eaby" s address. (Transcript, P. 12, Lines 5-6; P. 22, 
Lines 11-22 . ) 
6. On March 24, 1997, Eaby received a telephone call from Peck 
at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 AM. (Transcript, P. 12, Lines 15-23.) 
Upon hearing and recognizing Peck's voice, Eaby hung up the 
telephone. 
7. At the time of each of the above described calls, the 
parties' children were with Eaby, and Peck did not discuss 
visitation, nor did he have any known reason to be calling to 
discuss visitation. (Transcript, P. 10,Lines 6-8; P. 12, Line 25; 
P. 13, Lines 1-8; P. 23, Lines 22-25.) 
8. During the period encompassed by these telephone calls, the 
parties' had no contact regarding visitation. Visitation was 
handled through the respective mothers of Eaby and Peck. This was 
a system that had been agreed upon in Court at the time of the 
issuance of the protective order. (Transcript, P. 13, Lines 1-15, 
P. 28, Lines 16-21.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. SUFFICIENT FACTS WERE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF 
PECK'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Sufficient evidence was presented during the prosecution's 
case in chief to support each of the elements of the crime 
"Protective Orders Restraining Abuse of Another-Violation," §76-5-
108, Utah Code Annotated. Eaby testified that she received a series 
of late night/early morning telephone calls from Peck. During the 
call she received on February 20, 1997, the parties engaged in a 
short conversation interspersed with several lengthy moments of 
silence. At no time during this conversation did Peck raise the 
issue of visitation, which was the only reason he was permitted to 
contact Eaby. During this call, Peck appeared to Eaby to be upset. 
Shortly after the call, Eaby found in her vehicle a funeral notice 
for a close friend of Peck's. She testified that she believed Peck 
could be the only person who would place such a notice in her 
vehicle. 
The other conviction was based upon a call from Peck received 
by Eaby on March 24, 1997. This call occurred at approximately 1:00 
or 1:30 AM. Upon hearing and recognizing Peck's voice, Eaby hung up 
the telephone. With respect to both this call and the previous 
call, Eaby testified that the parties' children were with her at 
the time of the call, that there was no need for a discussion with 
7 
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Peck regarding visitation, that in fact, no discussions with Peck 
regarding visitation occurred at any time during this time period, 
and that the parties had arranged visitation through their 
respective mothers. 
Based on the foregoing, the City had established a prima facie 
case as to each element of the offense charged. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH 
CHARGES OF VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER. A 
MISTAKE IN THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGE WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
The trial court judge made an incorrect statement in his post 
verdict discussion as to one of the reasons why he believed Eaby's 
testimony to be more credible than Peck's. Given the substantial 
evidence contained in the record and the other reasons regarding 
credibility that were stated by the judge, this mistaken comment 
constitutes harmless error. 
Also, it appears from the transcript that the source of the 
judge's mistake was an incorrect characterization of the evidence 
by Peck's defense attorney during closing argument. Since parties 
cannot take advantage of errors which they lead the court into 
committing, this issue should be disregarded. 
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III. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT NEGATES ANY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS OF 
INNOCENCE. 
Peck's argument that the judge was required to acquit him 
because there existed a reasonable hypothesis of innocence is based 
upon an overbroad reading of State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah 
App. 1998) and is in conflict with the evidence presented at trial. 
The reasonable hypothesis of innocence ruling set forth in the 
Layman case is only applicable where the evidence consists solely 
of undisputed, circumstantial evidence and it does not require the 
prosecutor to disprove every reasonable hypothesis. In this case, 
there is direct evidence of the elements of the crime. Eaby 
testified that Peck made telephone calls to her. She also testified 
that during their conversation, albeit a brief one, the only 
allowable topic, visitation, was not discussed. Finally, both Eaby 
and Peck testified that they did not discuss visitation during the 
time period that the phone calls were made. Peck's own testimony 
provides direct evidence rebutting his "reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence/' Peck testified that he did not make the telephone calls 
at all. This puts him in the obviously untenable position of 
arguing that the calls may have been made for the allowed purpose 
of visitation and yet, at the same time testifying under oath that 
the calls were not made at all. 
9 
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IV. PECK'S BRIEF FAILS TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING THE 
VERDICTS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
All of the issues raised by Peck in this appeal have the 
common theme of attacking the factual findings of the trial court. 
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on appeal, 
the appellant must show that the findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous. In order to show error, the appellant must marshal all 
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact 
and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990) . Peck 
has failed to adequately marshal the evidence against him in this 
case which constitutes a separate and valid reason for affirming 
the decision of the trial court. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. SUFFICIENT FACTS WERE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF 
PECK'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating §76-5-108, 
Utah Code Annotated, ''Protective Orders Restraining Abuse of 
Another." There are two elements to this crime. First, the 
defendant must be subject to a properly served protective order 
issued pursuant to one of the applicable co-habitant abuse acts. 
Second, the defendant must have intentionally violated the terms of 
the order. 
10 
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In this case, there was ample evidence presented relating to 
each of these elements to support the trial court's denial of a 
motion to dismiss. The evidence presented by the prosecution's case 
in chief clearly demonstrated a prima facie violation of §76-5-108 
on both February 20th and March 27th, 1997. 
The facts presented in the prosecution's case in chief (found 
on pages 5-24 of the Transcript)are as follows: 
February 20, 1997 Violation 
1. . The victim, Amanda Eaby, testified that at approximately 
11:00 PM on February 20, 1997, she received a telephone 
call from Peck. 
2. Eaby testified that after she said "hello", Peck said her 
name. She further testified that at that point, since she 
was shocked to be contacted by Peck, she did not respond. 
She testified that after a pause, Peck then stated, "Can 
we talk for a minute?" Eaby replied, "No, we cannot," and 
there was again a pause in the conversation. Eaby then 
stated, "Okay, I'm going to hang up now." Eaby further 
testified that Peck then stated, "We can't speak for a 
minute?" To which she replied, "No," paused again, and 
then hung up the phone. 
3. Eaby testified that during this conversation, there was 
"... a lot of silence on the phone . . . , " and "... there were 
11 
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great moments of, you know, no talking and sitting 
there." ) 
In response to a question regarding her ability to tell 
Peck's emotions from his voice during the call, Eaby 
testified, "He seemed like something was wrong, like he 
wanted to speak with me. And it bothered me to have him 
on the phone and sound upset like that." 
Eaby further testified that approximately one half hour 
after the telephone call, she went out to lock up her 
car. During that process she found a funeral program for 
a friend of Peck's that had not been in her car prior to 
the phone call. She also testified that the funeral 
described in the program was for one of Peck's closest 
friends. Finally, she testified that she knew of no one, 
besides Peck, who would have any reason to put that 
funeral announcement in her car, that the funeral notice 
was the only notification she received of the death of 
Peck's friend, and that other friends of Peck, who also 
knew the deceased, did not know where she lived. 
On the subject of visitation, Eaby testified that at no 
time during the aforementioned telephone call did Peck 
mention their children or visitation. She also testified 
that at the time the protective order was issued, the 
parties had agreed to arrange visitation through their 
12 
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respective mothers. The children were with her at the 
time of the call since they did not have over night 
visits with Peck, and she also testified that she and 
Peck had no direct contact whatsoever, regarding 
visitation, during the time period encompassing the three 
telephone calls which were the subject of the 
prosecution. 
March 24, 1997. 
1. Eaby testified that on or about March 24, 1997, she 
received a telephone call from Peck at approximately 1:00 
or 1:30 AM. 
2. With regard to the conversation during this telephone 
call, Eaby testified, "As well as some of the other 
instances as soon as I answered the phone and heard his 
voice and recognized who it was and what it was about, I 
hung up the phone." 
3. With respect to the content of this telephone call, Eaby 
testified, "I can't imagine that it would be anything 
about visitation in the middle of the night while I'm 
sleeping..." As she had previously testified, visitation 
had been arranged through the parties' respective mothers 
and she never arranged visitation with Mr. Peck by phone 
during this period. 
13 
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The evidence presented by the prosecution's case in chief, as 
set forth above, clearly makes a prime facie case as to each 
element of the offense charged. 
The first element of the crime is not at issue. Eaby obtained 
a protective order on December 30, 1996, and Peck was present in 
court and was fully aware of the order. Among other things, the 
protective order prohibited any contact, including telephone 
contact, between the parties. Paragraph 3, the no contact section 
of the order, however, had been modified by the issuing judge with 
the phrase, ''Except for purposes of visitation." Therefore, the no 
contact provision of the protective order was not absolute and 
contact was allowed between'the parties for purposes of visitation. 
The second element of this crime is whether or not Peck 
intentionally violated the modified no contact provision of the 
protective order. The above described testimony of Ms. Eaby sets 
forth strong evidence for finding that Peck intentionally violated 
the protective order. 
With respect to the February 20, 1997, telephone call, the 
testimony showed that Eaby received a late night telephone call 
from Peck. According to her testimony, this call included at least 
some conversation and included several long pauses during which 
nobody spoke. Finally, Eaby hung up the telephone. She testified 
that there was no discussion of visitation with Peck during this 
telephone call, nor did she discuss any visitation with Peck by 
14 
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telephone during this time period. Based upon her description of 
the telephone conversation, it is clear that Peck had ample 
opportunity to state his business and he utterly failed to do so. 
The clear terms of the protective order allowed Peck to contact 
Eaby by telephone for purposes of visitation, and for that purpose 
only. Despite having the opportunity of several seconds of silence 
during various parts of the conversation, Peck failed to state the 
purpose of his call. Obviously a call such as this violates the 
terms of the protective order. Peck cannot simply call, not state 
his business, yet remain on the phone and then, when confronted 
with a violation of the order, fall back on the notion that he 
possibly would have raised visitation issues at some point during 
the call. 
The fact that this call had nothing to do with visitation is 
corroborated by other evidence. Eaby testified that Peck seemed 
upset when she was talking to him. Also, she found the funeral 
notice for Peck's friend in her car shortly after the telephone 
call. She testified that it was her belief that the only person 
that could have left the notice there was Peck since none of Peck's 
other friends would have known where she lived. Also, she testified 
that she had received no other notice regarding this funeral. 
Finally, an additional corroborating factor is that Eaby and 
Peck apparently never had a discussion regarding visitation. She 
testified that visitation was handled through their respective 
15 
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mothers, as had been arranged at the time of the issuance of the 
protective order, and that she and Peck never discussed visitation 
by telephone during this period. If Peck has been calling for 
visitation reasons, it seems that those reasons mysteriously 
disappeared. 
Taken as a whole, the above evidence is sufficient to defeat 
Peck's Motion to Dismiss the February 20, 1997, violation. 
Many of the same arguments can be made with respect to the 
March 24, 1997, telephone call. This call was also clearly a 
violation of the protective order. 
Ms. Eaby's testimony was that on March 24, 1997, she received 
a telephone call from Peck at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 in the 
morning. While the parties had very little conversation during this 
call, there is every indication from the evidence that this call 
had nothing to do with visitation. 
First, the timing of the call is important. Eaby testified 
that this call woke her up at approximately 1:00 or 1:30 AM in the 
morning. This followed the pattern of the previous two phone calls 
which she received on February 20, 1997, and February 2, 1997. All 
of these calls occurred either very late at night (11:00 PM on 
February 20, 1997) or in the early morning hours (1:00 AM on 
February 2, 1997, and 1:00 AM or 1:30 AM on March 24, 1997). The 
timing of this call, when combined with the fact that there were no 
discussions regarding visitation during the call, nor were there 
16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
any other discussions by telephone regarding visitation during this 
time period, demonstrate that this call is simply one more in a 
series of late night telephone calls. Such late night calls are 
naturally frightening to a victim who has had to resort to 
obtaining a protective order from the caller. Since Eaby had her 
children with her at the time and there were no discussions with 
Peck during this period regarding visitation, there was obviously 
no emergency, and in fact, no visitation motive whatsoever, for 
Peck to call Eaby at 1:00 or 1:30 AM. From this evidence, the judge 
correctly inferred that it was not Peck's intent to discuss 
visitation and therefore, the call was in violation of the statute. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the City had 
established a prima facie case with respect to each violation. The 
parties had agreed that the protective order was in place, and the 
evidence that was presented made it obvious that it was not Peck's 
intention to discuss visitation because of the timing and nature of 
the calls and the supporting evidence. The trial court judge 
correctly denied Peck's Motion to Dismiss. 
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT ON BOTH 
CHARGES OF VIOLATING A PROTECTIVE ORDER. A 
MISTAKE IN THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGE WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Peck asserts that the court's judgment in this case is not 
supported by the evidence. His basis for this contention is one of 
the court's post verdict comment regarding Peck's credibility. The 
17 
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trial court judge commented that Mr. Peck stated, "I don't recall 
making such calls," with respect to certain questions he had been 
asked. A review of the transcript reveals that Peck is correct and 
the trial court judge was mistaken in his recollection of that 
statement. However, in light of the source of the judge's confusion 
and the other substantial evidence that supports the verdict, trial 
judge's mistaken recollection is harmless error. 
This issue was not preserved in the record below by any 
objection or other action by Peck. In essence, the issue that is 
being raised now on appeal is really just a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. In a criminal case a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence is governed by a clear and ambiguous 
standard. The Utah Supreme Court has articulated that standard as 
follows: 7 
When reviewing the findings of a trial judge 
sitting without a jury, this court will 
overturn a guilty verdict only if it is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 192-193 (Utah 1987).The basis of this 
standard is Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, "Findings by the Court": 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury. . . the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon... Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991)(Footnote omitted). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has defined the "clearly erroneous" 
standard as follows: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court, on the entire evidence, is left with a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed. 
Further clarification is offered by Wright and 
Miller: The appellate court... does not 
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The 
mere fact that on the same evidence the 
appellant court might have reached a different 
result does not justify it in setting the 
findings aside. It may regard a finding as 
clearly erroneous only if the finding is 
without adequate evidentiary support or 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals has followed the guidance 
of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Germonto, 886 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1983), by stating: 
In considering the challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict... If, during the review, we find some 
evidence or inferences upon which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, we affirm. 
State v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576, 581 (Utah App. 1994). 
In this case, the evidence presented to the trial court was 
more than sufficient to sustain the conviction. The bulk of that 
evidence is set forth in Argument I above and was presented in the 
City's case in chief. In addition, a crucial portion of that 
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evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Peck. Peck admitted 
i 
that he had not talked to Eaby regarding visitation during the 
period of the telephone calls. Peck was asked: 
Q. "Now, subsequent to all of this, have you had some times when 
you've talked to her, communicated with her with respect to the 
subject of visitation?" 
A. "I haven't." 
Q."Or any subject?" 
A. "No." 
Transcript, P. 28 Lines. 16-21. 
The mistaken comment made by the trial court judge was but one 
of several comments made by the judge in explaining his verdict. A 
close examination of the transcript reveals the potential source of 
the judge's confusion. In closing argument, Peck's defense attorney 
stated, "He says he didn't call her on these occasions, or didn't 
recall calling her on those occasions." He also stated, "That could 
have been February 2d, but we don't know and he doesn't have 
specific memory for the dates." 
Transcript, P. 35, Lines 4-6 and 8-10. 
These statements by Peck's defense attorney appear to be the 
obvious source of the judge's mistaken comment. 
Peck should not be allowed to profit from a mistaken comment 
of the judge if it appears that Peck was the source of the mistake. 
Parties cannot take advantage of errors when the party led the 
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court into committing the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P2d 1201 (Utah 
1993). 
In any event, the error by the trial court judge is harmless. 
Harmless errors are those errors which are sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) . The burden of showing that an error 
has been harmful rests with the complaining party. State v. 
Robertson, 923 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). Peck has not carried that 
burden. To the contrary, as has been demonstrated, there is ample 
evidence in the record to support the convictions. The trial court 
stated several other reasons for finding Ms. Eaby's testimony to be 
more credible than Mr. Peck's. Among these were Mr. Peck's failure 
to recall even the approximate date of his alleged "accidental" 
call to Ms. Eaby, and the corroborating evidence of the funeral 
notice that was found in her car. 
Also, with respect to the funeral notice, the judge correctly 
recognized that Peck was never questioned and, therefore, never 
provided testimony about the notice. As a result, the only evidence 
before the Court regarding the funeral notice was the testimony of 
Ms. Eaby as to where and when it had been found and her belief that 
it could have no source other than Mr. Peck. The court's reliance 
on this testimony is proper and is a natural consequence of Peck's 
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failure to deny or explain the testimony of Eaby. State v. Romero, 
554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
Based on the above, and the evidence as set forth in the 
previous argument, the verdict of the trial court is supported by 
the evidence, is not clearly erroneous and, therefore, should be 
affirmed. 
III. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT NEGATES ANY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS OF 
INNOCENCE. 
Peck relies on the case of State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah 
App. 1998), in advancing a theory that a reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence exists and, therefore, the trial court should have 
acquitted Peck. This reliance on Layman is misplaced, since a close 
reading of the case indicates that it is simply not applicable to 
the case at bar. 
The reasonable hypothesis of innocence ruling set forth in the 
Layman case has very clearly defined parameters for its use. It 
applies only to cases where the evidence consists solely of 
undisputed, circumstantial evidence and it does not require the 
prosecutor to disprove every reasonable hypothesis. Layman at 
P.786; see also State v. Lyman, 352 Utah Adv. Rep 13, Footnote 3 
(Utah App. 1998.) 
The Layman case was such a case where the only evidence was 
undisputed and circumstantial. Layman, at Footnote 3. 
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In this case, there is direct evidence of the elements of the 
crime. Eaby testified that Peck made telephone calls to her. She 
also testified that during their conversation, albeit a brief one, 
the only allowable topic, visitation, was not discussed. Finally, 
both Eaby and Peck testified that they did not discuss visitation 
during the period that the phone calls were made. 
The majority of the Court in Layman recognized that, " *The 
existence of one or more alternate reasonable hypothesis does not 
necessarily prevent the [fact finder] "from concluding that 
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1995, cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 
(Utah 1996)", Layman, at Footnote 4. The Layman Court also 
approvingly quoted the Blubaugh decision with regard to conflicting 
evidence supporting different hypothesis. The Court stated, "We 
also note that in Blubaugh, the jury was presented with conflicting 
evidence supporting the different hypothesis; in such instances, 
Ait is within the province of the jury to judge the credibility of 
the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject these 
alternative hypothesis.'" Layman, at Footnote 4. 
The case at bar is a case with conflicting evidence supporting 
different hypothesis. However, there is no evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that Peck advances in his brief. Peck's own testimony at 
trial directly conflicts with the reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence that he now claims. Peck testified at trial that he did 
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not make the telephone calls. This is direct evidence rebutting the 
notion that the calls may have been made for visitation purposes, 
his "hypothesis of innocence." Peck is arguing that the calls may 
have been made for the allowed purpose and yet at the same time has 
testified that the calls were not made. Peck cannot have it both 
ways . 
Peck's contention that a reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
exists in this case is not founded upon evidence presented to the 
trial court and should therefore, be disregarded. 
IV. PECK'S BRIEF FAILS TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM SUPPORTING THE 
VERDICTS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
All of the issues raised by Peck in this appeal have a common 
theme. The trial court's reasoning in denying the Motion to 
Dismiss, the assertion that the court's findings are not supported 
by the record, and the allegation that the court ignored a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence, are all essentially attacks 
upon the sufficiency of the evidence and the factual findings of 
the trial court. The law of the State of Utah on this subject is 
well settled. When challenging the findings of fact of the trial 
court on appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact 
were clearly erroneous. In order to show error, the appellant must 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
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support the findings against an attack. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 
474 (Utah 1990). 
Much of the evidence presented to the trial court which 
supports the verdict and/or corroborates the testimony of Eaby is 
absent from Peck's brief. Peck's failure to adequately marshal the 
evidence against him is a separate and valid reason for affirming 
the decision of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
There is sufficient evidence to support both the trial court's 
denial of Peck's Motion to Dismiss and the ultimate verdicts in 
this case. Also, Peck's argument regarding the "reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence" is in direct conflict with the testimony 
provided by him at trial. Finally, Peck has failed to adequately 
marshal the evidence against himself and then demonstrate that the 
trial court reached a clearly erroneous decision. The verdicts of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ffr day of ri£{lu4&J , 1999. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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